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In PI 246 Wittgenstein remarks: »In what sense 
are my sensations private?« This question is embedded in 
a broader context that deals with the possibility of a private 
language (cf. PI 243-315). Sensations can thereby be 
considered with respect to an epistemic as well as a 
possessive kind of privacy. In PI 246 Wittgenstein refers to 
statements of the form »Only I can know that I am pain 
whereas others can only surmise it«. He then argues that 
such expressions are in one sense false and in another 
nonsense. Although this remark refers to the epistemic 
aspect of privacy I shall argue that this semantic 
differentiation also holds for sentences stating the 
ownership of sensations.  
It is of course clear that those paragraphs involve 
a huge amount of questions such as: Are sensations 
private objects? Is there a logical difference between 
sentences using the verb »to have« in connection with 
mental expressions such as »I have a bad feeling«, »I 
have no idea«, etc. and sentences such as »I have 5 Euro 
in my pocket«, »I have grey hair« etc.? Can two 
sensations be identical? What is the connection between 
sensations and their expressions? Can present mental 
phenomena justify my using mental vocabulary in referring 
to them? just to mention a few. For several different 
reasons none of those questions can explicitly be taken 
into account here, although I think the problem of 
ambiguity concerning first person psychological statements 
can at least be pointed at. The paper shall therefore 
concentrate on the question in what sense statements of 
the above kind can in one way be false (or true) in another 
nonsensical for this also seems to be one of the crucial 
arguments in Wittgenstein’s treatment of metaphysical 
propositions. 
In order to understand the remark in PI 246 we 
have to get clear about the problem that is involved here 
and Wittgenstein’s way of dealing with it. This is, generally 
speaking, part of his whole conception of language and the 
role metaphysics plays in it.  
All of Wittgenstein’s writings centre around the 
relation between language and reality, so to speak. There, 
the question of what it means for a sentence to have 
sense, of what it means to say something plays an 
essential role. And within this context of language, sense 
and nonsense we also have to look for the placing of 
metaphysics.  
When Wittgenstein started doing philosophy again 
in 1929 he realized the incompleteness of the Tractarian 
symbolism that seemed to have forced him to introduce 
the concept of a rule, in a sense that rules that are not part 
of the logical syntax could rule the use of propositions. The 
concept of »logical syntax« disappeared in his writings and 
he introduced the idea of a grammar which was closely 
connected with the application of language. In a single 
lecture on necessary propositions (hithero unpublished) 
Wittgenstein remarks: »What I call a rule of grammar is not 
what would be found in grammar books. (…) Ordinary 
grammar deals with rules about the order of words, gender 
etc. No one could learn the use of language from such a 
grammar only. (…) You could make quite formal rules 
about the use of the language, the sounds etc. You could 
also make rules relating to the sort of situation in which the 
sounds were used. Finally you could get what I choose to 
call ‘rules of grammar’.« Although Wittgenstein does not 
tell us explicitly what he means by »rules of grammar« it 
seems clear that the concept of a rule or grammatical 
sentence is closely related to the way an expression is 
used in language. To understand the idea that a 
proposition can both be true (false) and nonsensical we 
have to look at this conception of a rule and its relation to 
empirical and metaphysical propositions:  
»The statement ‘Only I have real toothache’, either 
has a commonsense meaning, or, if it is a grammatical 
proposition, it is meant to be a statement of a rule.« 
(Wittgenstein 1979, 22). This remark already indicates the 
problem of a particular semantical ambiguity that is 
involved in statements of such kind. About the relation 
between grammatical rules, metaphysical statements and 
empirical propositions Wittgenstein makes the following 
interesting remark: »And it is particularly difficult to 
discover that an assertion which the metaphysician makes 
expresses discontentment with our grammar when the 
words of this assertion can also be used to state a fact of 
experience.« (Wittgenstein 1972, 56-57). Thus when in a 
particular situation someone claims that only his pain is 
real he might just want to say that all the others are 
pretending. Or when he argues that a particular object 
does not exist when no one looks at it, he might just want 
to point out that it vanishes, when it is not looked at. A 
solipsist, however, who states that only his pain is real 
pain, does not want to make any empirical assumptions 
about the pretense of other people, e.g., that he has good 
reasons to assume that they are only cheating. What he 
wants to say is that it is inconceivable to imagine that 
anyone except him could be in pain. This conception of 
what is possible to imagine and what makes sense to say 
is already found in the Tractatus. A proposition that has 
sense expresses a possible state of a affairs, a state that 
is imaginable in the sense that the statement that 
expresses it does not contain a contradiction or concepts 
excluding each other (cf. Some Remarks on Logical Form). 
And as we shall see the distinction Wittgenstein draws 
between empirical and logical impossibility is crucial for the 
whole understanding of a grammatical proposition.  
In PI 251 we find another remark about the idea of 
inconceivability of the opposite and the confusion of 
grammatical and empirical propositions. In this passage 
Wittgenstein points out that this impossibility is not due to 
the human powers of imagination as if it were only a 
question of trying hard enough. The form of a sentence like 
»I can’t imagine the opposite« in contexts of the privacy of 
sensations or the knowledge about having pains etc. 
equals an empirical proposition but is really a grammatical 
one.  
So, let us look at a few examples to try to clarify 
the semantic ambiguity of the two kinds of expressions. If 
our assumption is right, sentences such as, »Another 
person can’t have my pains«, »I can’t feel your pain«, »I 
feel my toothache«, »Two people can’t have the same 
pain«, »Only I have real pain« etc. can both have a truth 
value or be nonsensical.  
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The best way to point out the ambiguity is to 
choose a rather radical example Wittgenstein introduces to 
point out the difference between logical and empirical 
impossibility. This grammatical difficulty becomes most 
obvious when we introduce the idea of having pain in 
another person’s body, say teeth. Here the metaphysical 
proposition »I can’t feel another person’s pain« differs from 
the experiential proposition »I can’t have pain in another 
person’s mouth« (cf. Wittgenstein 1972, 49), which is the 
expression of an empirical impossibility. Since the negation 
does, however, not contain a contradiction, it is imaginable 
to have pain in another person’s body. So to say »I cannot 
have your pain« would be false if it is meant in the sense 
»I cannot have pain in your tooth« whereas »I cannot have 
your toothache« because my pain is mine and yours is 
yours would be nonsense, forbidden by syntax, as 
Wittgenstein puts it. In the Philosophical Remarks and 
elsewhere he argues that the concept of pain differs 
according to intensity and location but not according to a 
possessor and in particular to a physical body, an 
assumption that is fundamental to understand the idea of 
having pain in another person’s body. So the toothache 
case is a perfect example to illustrate the difference 
between logical and physical impossibility which I think is 
basic for Wittgenstein’s distinction between sense and 
nonsense he draws in PI 246 and elsewhere. 
This example also shows the grammatical 
asymmetry between first person and third person 
statements in metaphysical contexts as opposed to 
empirical one’s. Here the question of given criteria seems 
crucial. When Wittgenstein raises the question about the 
criteria of identity for pains (cf. PI 253), it looks as though 
he wants to imply that there are no such criteria which I 
think is a false interpretation. What the question does imply 
is that the criteria show in what way it makes sense to 
speak of »the same« in connection with pains. In one of 
his lectures (1979, 18) Wittgensteins remarks the 
following: »It makes sense to say “His ache is worse than 
mine”, but not to say “I feel my toothache” and “Two 
people can’t have the same pain”. Consider the statement 
that no two people can ever see the same sense datum. If 
being in the same position as another person were taken 
as the criterion for someone’s seeing the same sense 
datum as he does, than one could imagine a person 
seeing the same datum, say, by seeing through someone’s 
head. But if there is no criterion for seeing the same 
datum, than “I can’t know that he sees what I see” does 
not make sense. We are likely to muddle statements of 
fact which are undisputed with grammatical statements. 
Statements of fact and grammatical statements are not to 
be confused.« So if there are criteria that allow to speak of 
»sameness« even in cases of sense perception than it 
does make sense to apply the concept and the particular 
propositions would either be true or false. 
Furthermore, if the expression »toothache« has 
the same meaning both in first person and third person 
statements than why should we not say that two persons 
have the same pain? Wittgenstein’s point seems to be that 
we can speak of »the same pain« if »I« and »he« are on 
the same logical level. If I use such a proposition in a 
context where both pronouns are meant to be on the same 
level than the proposition does have sense. This means in 
other words that both those pronouns are possible 
arguments for the same function. If we, e.g., allow an 
expression such as »unconscious pain«1 than I can 
                                                     
1»Again, when in a metaphysical sense I say “I must always know when I have 
pain”, this simply makes the word “know” redundant; and instead of “I know 
that I have pain”, I can simply say “I have pain”. The matter is different, of 
course, if we give the phrase “unconscious pain” sense by fixing experiential 
criteria for the case in which a man has pain and doesn’t know it, and if then 
we say (rightly or wrongly) that as a matter of fact nobody has ever had pains 
which he didn't know of.« (Wittgenstein 1972, 55). And in his lecture on 
equally say with sense »He has pains I do not feel« and »I 
have pains I do not feel« or generally speaking substitute 
first person for third person pronouns. In both cases the 
verification methods could be the same. If on the contrary 
we are in a context where someone (say a solipsist) wants 
to point out the unique role of the first person in the sense 
that in his grammar »I« or »personal experience« has »no 
neighbour« (cf. Wittgenstein 1972, 71 or Klagge 1993, 
229) than first person statements of the above kind are 
nonsense. This point obviously hangs together with 
Wittgenstein’s understanding of metaphysical statements 
being used without an antithesis (cf. Wittgenstein 1972, 
45).  
Another example concerning »sameness of pains« 
is found in the Blue and Brown Books. Wittgenstein 
introduces the phrase »I won’t feel your cold« in a context 
where we might be angry with someone who wants to go 
out on a cold day with a cold in his head and this phrase 
could mean something like »I don't suffer when you catch 
a cold« which is a proposition taught by experience. »For 
we could imagine a, so to speak, wireless connection 
between the two bodies which made one person feel pain 
in his head when the other had exposed his to the cold air« 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 54). And against the argument that my 
pain is my pain because it is in my head Wittgenstein 
constructs a scenario which is quite similar to the Siamese 
twins case. Two persons share one part of their bodies, 
say, a hand. Nerves and tendons of A’s arm are connected 
to B’s hand by operation. Now let’s imagine that the hand 
got stung by a wesp, both A and B cry, contort their faces 
give the same description of the pain etc. Would we now 
say they have the same pain or a different one? 
Wittgenstein goes on: »“We feel pain in the same place, in 
the same body, our descriptions tally, but still my pain can’t 
be his”, I suppose as a reason you will be inclined to say: 
“because my pain is my pain and his pain is his pain”. And 
here you are making a grammatical statement about the 
use of such a phrase as “the same pain”. You say that you 
don’t wish to apply the phrase, “he has got my pain” or “we 
both have the same pain”, and instead, perhaps, you will 
apply such a phrase as “his pain is exactly like mine”.« 
(Wittgenstein 1972, 54). 
The same point is illustrated by the Siamese twins 
example (cf. PI 253) where a sentence like »Each of them 
has a different pain« is opposed to »They both have the 
same pain«. So if one of them is true the other is false but 
not nonsense, e.g. when one feels a throbbing pain the 
other a burning one. Again, one who wants to state that 
they cannot have the same pain, using »cannot« as a 
logical cannot, does not want to distinguish two 
experiences.  
Those examples show, it seems to me, at least 
two things: 
If there are criteria for calling something, e.g., the 
»same pain«, such as location or intensity, than it does 
make sense to say that two persons can feel the same 
pain and so sentences like »We can’t have the same 
pain«, »I can’t have his pain« would be false but not 
nonsensical and  
If one makes a metaphysical statement about »the 
same pain« where there are no such criteria than the 
proposition is nonsense. He should therefore consider 
something like: »I don’t wish to apply the phrase “He has 
                                                                             
necessary propositions Wittgenstein says: »There is no reason why I should 
not say “I have unconscious toothache” if a.) I feel no pain, b.) I have a bad 
tooth. Saying this would produce depression and fear. It suggests that if I don’t 
feel it now I shall feel it in a second.« The notion of »unconscious toothache« 
is also discussed in the Blue and Brown Books (cf. Wittgenstein 1972, 22-23).  
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got my pain”, “We both have the same pain”« etc. as a rule 
that would forbid expressions of such kind. 
These two assumptions already point at one of 
Wittgenstein’s proposals to avoid meaning ambiguities 
which he discusses in several places: the introduction of 
an alternative notation with a system of rules that 
determines the use of expressions in a way that avoids the 
confusion of empirical and metaphysical statements. 
(Another rather simple alternative is indicated in PI 116: 
»What we do is to bring words back from their 
metaphysical to their everyday usage.«) 
This solution, however, does not touch 
Wittgenstein’s second diagnosis of metaphysical 
propositions which is certainly more fundamental for it 
directly points to the claim of such statements: The 
metaphysician wants to say something about the nature of 
things but all he really does is confusing such statements 
with grammatical rules about the use of expressions, for 
according to Wittgenstein »I can’t feel his pain« is not 
something about the nature of pain but a grammatical 
remark about the concept of pain. »It seems as though it 
would be not false but nonsense to say “I feels his pains”, 
but as though this were because of the nature of pain, of 
the person etc. as though, therefore the statement were 
ultimately a statement about the nature of things. So we 
speak for example of an asymmetry in our mode of 
expression and we look on it as a mirror image of the 
essence of the things« (Klagge 1993, 208-209).2 
 
 
 
                                                     
2»Philosophische Untersuchungen: begriffliche Untersuchungen. Das 
Wesentliche der Metaphysik: daß sie den Unterschied zwischen sachlichen 
und begrifflichen Untersuchungen verwischt.« (Wittgenstein 1992, 381)  
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